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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this Appeal from
the Third Judicial District Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(a) (1992).

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the District Court correctly determined and apply the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof in a trial de novo
and review of an informal adjudicative proceeding involving
allegations of criminal violations ?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing questions of law, the appellate court uses a
correctness of error standard.

Neiderhauser Builders and Dev.

Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App. 1992).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are pertinent to resolution
of the issues presented on appeal, and are set forth verbatim in
Exhibit "A" attached hereto:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
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Code
Code
Code
Code
Code

Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.

§
§
§
§
§

32A-5-107
32A-12-101
32A-12-201
63-46b-15
63-46b-17
l

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.

This case involves an action by the

DABC against Pop Jenks for alleged violations of certain criminal
provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act.
Course of Proceedings.

The DABC filed a Complaint against

Pop Jenks and an informal hearing was held before the DABC
Commission regarding the DABC's Complaint.

Pop Jenks filed a

Petition for Review of the informal adjudicative hearing and a
trial de novo before the Third Judicial District Court.

The

Third Judicial District Court conducted the trial de novo and
dismissed the DABC's Complaint against Pop Jenks.

The DABC filed

an appeal of the District Court's decision with the Court of
Appeals.
Disposition in District Court.

The District Court,

Honorable David S. Young, dismissed with prejudice the DABC's
Complaint against Pop Jenks which alleged violation of certain
criminal provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, and
ordered all references to such hearing and conviction before the
DABC Commission expunged from the records of Pop Jenks within ten
(10) days from the date of the order.

am-jenks.brf
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff/Appellee RAINBOW TROUT, INC., dba POP JENKS,

is a Utah Corporation and a DABC private club liquor licensee
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 32A-5-101, et seq. (hereinafter
referred to as "Pop Jenks").
2.

Defendants/Appellants STATE OF UTAH and the DEPARTMENT

OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, a duly authorized department of
the State of Utah, are hereinafter collectively referred to as
"the DABC".
3.

On December 18, 1991, two (2) undercover agents entered

"Pop Jenks," a private club located in Park City, Utah.

(R. at

143) .
4.

The agents requested service from a bartender who wore

a DABC Badge with the name of "Aldis."
5.

Aldis asked if the agents were members of the club, to

which they replied they were not.
6.

(R. at 143).

(R. at 143).

Aldis then sought sponsorship for the agents from an

undisclosed person in the club, who responded that he could not
sponsor the agents because he was "on duty," but that "Steve is
in the back room, he will sponsor you."
7.

(R. at 143).

"Steve," a co-owner of the club who was not on duty at

the time, gave the bartender, Aldis, the "ok" sign with his hand
as a sign of being willing to sponsor the agents.
am-jenks.brf
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(R. at 143).

8.

The agents were then served a drink.

(R. at 144).

9.

On December 18, 1991, the Utah State Division of

Narcotics and Liquor Law Enforcement filed a criminal Complaint
Form with the DABC charging Pop Jenks with a criminal offense.
(See Exhibit "B" attached hereto).
10.

Based upon the above Complaint Form, the DABC filed a

Complaint against Pop Jenks on December 23, 1991, alleging
violations of Section 32A-5-107(5), 32A-5-107(7) and 32A-12-201
of the Utah Alcoholic Beverage Control Act for selling alcoholic
beverages to "unsponsored guests" (referred to herein as "the
Complaint").
11.

(R. at 131).

On March 26, 1992, an informal hearing was held before

administrative hearing officer Richard R. Golden.

The

administrative hearing officer, by Order dated April 24, 1992,
found Pop Jenks guilty of violating Utah Code Ann. § 32A-5-107
and § 32A-12-201, suspended Pop Jenks 7 license for five (5) days
and assessed administrative costs against Pop Jenks in the amount
of $535.00.
12.

(R. at 131).

On May 26, 1993, Pop Jenks filed an Amended Petition

for Review and Trial De Novo before the Third Judicial District
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15.
13.

On February 15, 1994, a trial was held before the

Honorable David S. Young.
am-jenks.brf

(R. at 43-45).

Judge Young, by Judgment dated March
A

15, 1994, dismissed with prejudice the DABC's Complaint against
Pop Jenks and ordered all reference to the hearing and conviction
before the DABC Commission expunged from the records of Pop Jenks
within ten (10) days from the date of the order.

(R. at 160).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The District Court correctly applied the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" burden of proof in its trial de novo and review
of the DABC's informal adjudicative hearing.
The DABC Complaint against Pop Jenks alleges violation of
criminal statutes set forth in the Utah Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act.

Violation of such statutes are considered class A

and B misdemeanors.

Enforcement of such provisions are subject

to the Utah Criminal Code.

Under the Utah Criminal Code, the

correct burden of proof regarding criminal offenses is "beyond a
reasonable doubt."
The District Court review of an informal administrative
agency determination is required to be a trial de novo.

When the

trial de novo and review involves alleged violations of criminal
statutes, the correct burden of proof at such trial is "beyond a
reasonable doubt."

This is true regardless of the burden of

proof required at the informal administrative agency
adjudication.
am- j enks.brf

Administrative hearings are by nature "informal"
-

and are not subject to the technical rules of evidence, procedure
and burdens of proof to which trial court proceedings are
subject.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE PROPER
BURDEN OF PROOF IN ITS TRIAL DE NOVO AND REVIEW OF THE
DABC'S INFORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING IN THIS CASE IS
"BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT,"
A.

EACH ELEMENT OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE MUST BE PROVED
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

It is well-established Utah law that each element of a
criminal offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Section 76-1-501 of the Utah Code provides:

"A defendant in a

criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each element
of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1992).

"Offense" is defined

as "a violation of any penal statute of this state."

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-1-601(6) (1992).x
In the case at hand, Pop Jenks was charged by the DABC with
violating Utah Code Ann. § 32A-5-107(5), § 32A-5-107(7) and
§ 32A-12-201(1) for the alleged unlawful sale or service of
alcoholic beverages or products. These provisions are considered

1

As noted in the DABC's Brief, "[fundamental respect for the liberty of individuals requires a
stringent burden of proof in any case in which a person faces criminal punishment" and "[t]he
imposition of this burden upon the prosecution reflects the dire nature of the penalties that can occur
if guilt is established." DABC Brief at 5.
am-jenks.brf
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penal statutes and constitute "criminal offenses" as defined by
the Utah Code.2

Section 32A-12-104 provides that any person who

violates Title 32A or any commission rules adopted thereunder is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided in the
Title.

Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-104 (1991).

Section 32A-12-101

also provides that the criminal provisions of the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act are subject to the Utah Criminal Code.
Section 32A-12-101 provides:
Chapters 1,2,3 and 4, Title 76, the Utah Criminal Code,
relating to principles of construction, jurisdiction,
venue, limitations of actions, multiple prosecutions,
double jeopardy, burdens of proof, definitions and
inchoate offenses apply to any criminal offense defined
in this title, except as otherwise provided.
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-101 (1991) (emphasis added).
Thus, the charge against Pop Jenks under § 32A-5-107 is
considered a class B misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment not
to exceed six (6) months and/or a fine not to exceed $1,000.00.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-12-101, 76-3-204 and 76-3-301 (1992).

The

charge under § 32A-12-201 is considered a class A misdemeanor,
punishable by imprisonment not to exceed one (1) year and/or a
fine not to exceed $2,500.00.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-12-201(2),

76-3-204 and 76-3-301 (1992).

The enforcement of these statutes

is subject to the provisions of the Utah Criminal Code, including

2

Chapter 12 of Title 32A is entitled "criminal offenses."

am-jenks.brf
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those provisions relating to burdens of proof•
32A-12-101 (1992).

Utah Code Ann,

Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501, the proper

burden of proof to apply to the enforcement of such provisions is
"beyond a reasonable doubt."
B.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1992).

THE DISTRICT COURTS REVIEW OF THE DABC'S INFORMAL
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING IS BY TRIAL DE NOVO.

Pop Jenks petitioned the District Court for judicial review
of an informal adjudicative proceeding of the DABC pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 (1993).

Under Section 63-46b-15, such

judicial review of a final agency action resulting from informal
adjudicative proceedings is by "trial de novo."

The trial de

novo is in essence a new trial wherein the trial court gives no
deference to the administrative finding below.

The district

court is required under Section 63-46b-15 to hold a new trial and
may not just review the informal record.

Cordova v. Blackstock,

224 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Brinkerhoff v.
Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 588 (Utah App. 1990).

Utah Courts and

the legislature recognize that there are significant differences
between trial court proceedings and administrative hearings.3
The primary purpose of the trial de novo provided under Section

3

The technical rules of evidence are not applicable at administrative proceedings. In contrast, all
pleadings and procedures of court proceedings are governed by such rules and the rules of civil and
criminal procedure. It is specifically provided at Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(2)(b) and (3)(b) that the
trial de novo before the district court is governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah
Rules of Evidence.
am-jenks.brf
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63-46b-15 is to allow the district courts to consider and remedy
any deficiencies that might arise by nature of the informalities
of the agency hearing•

Cordova. 224 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18, fn 1

(citing Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm/n, 681 P.2d 1224,
1226 (Utah 1984).
Under Section 63-46b-15, the District Court was required to
conduct a new trial regarding the criminal offenses alleged in
the DABC's Complaint against Pop Jenks, including alleged
violations of Sections 32A-5-107 and 32A-12-201 of the Utah Code.
At such trial, the District Court was not limited to affirming or
denying the administrative agency's finding that Pop Jenks
violated the criminal statutes alleged, nor to upholding or
reversing the agency's decision to suspend Pop Jenks' liquor
license.

In a trial de novo, the District Court is permitted to

make its own finding as to Pop Jenks' alleged violation of the
statutes, and to determine its own punishment or penalty for any
such violation.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-17 (1993), the

District Court, reviewing an informal adjudicative proceeding by
trial de novo, is entitled to provide judicial relief through the
award of damages or compensation authorized by statute and to
order any agency action required by law.
46b-17 (1993).

Utah Code Ann. § 63-

If the District Court found Pop Jenks guilty of

the charges in the complaint, Pop Jenks could have been guilty of
am-jenks.brf
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a class A or B misdemeanor and sentenced to a maximum of one (1)
year in jail, fined up to $2,500.00 and/or had its license
suspended.

With such a result possible at the trial de novo, Pop

Jenks was entitled to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of
proof, and the District Court was required to apply such a
burden.4
C.

THE CASES CITED BY THE DABC FAIL TO CONTRADICT THE
DISTRICT COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE CORRECT BURDEN OF
PROOF IN THE TRIAL DE NOVO IS BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.

DABC contends that the burden of proof at the trial de novo
should have been "a preponderance of the evidence."

This

contention is based upon the case of Walker v. Board of Pardons.
803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990).

Walker involves an appeal from an

order dismissing a writ of habeas corpus wherein the appellant
claims his parole was improperly revoked.

The Walker opinion

consists of three paragraphs with very little, if any, meaningful
analysis of the issues.

In dicta, the opinion notes that "[t]he

burden of proof in a criminal proceeding is beyond a reasonable
doubt" and that "[i]n an administrative proceeding, it is by a
preponderance of the evidence."

Walker, 803 P.2d at 1241 (citing

Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1986)).
4

However, these

DABC concedes in its Brief that if Pop Jenks had been found guilty of a class B misdemeanor for
violating the liquor laws, it could have faced up to six (6) months in jail and/or a fine of up to $1,000.00,
and that "[t]his substantial deprivation of liberty requires the heaviest burden of proof possible."
DABC Brief at 8.
am-jenks.brf
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quotes are taken out of context and improperly cite Johns v.
Shulsen for such a broad-sweeping conclusion.

The holding in

Johns is limited to the conclusion that the burden of proof in a
parol revocation hearing is by preponderance of the evidence.
This conclusion should not be applied in the case at hand as the
facts and circumstances are distinguishable.

First, Johns and

Walker involve the review of parol revocation hearings.

Utah

case law has previously established that parole revocation is of
a civil, rather than criminal nature, and that such proceedings
are administrative rather than criminal, since the proceedings
stem from a clear violation of the rules and regulations imposed
as a condition of parole.

Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P.2d at 1339

(Utah 1986) (citing Ward v. Smith, 573 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 1978),
and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).

In the case

at hand, the proceedings stem from a violation of state penal
statutes.

In addition, the sanctions for violation of parol are

remedial in nature rather than punitive.
1339.

Johns, 717 P.2d at

In the case at hand, the sanctions for violation of the

statutes are punitive.

Thus, the Johns conclusion that the

burden of proof in an administrative hearing is by a
preponderance of the evidence is limited to the facts of that
case and the type of hearing involved; i.e. a parol revocation
hearing and the underlying violations alleged.
am-jenks.brf
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Regardless of the above clarification, the Johns and Walker
language regarding burden of proof in an administrative hearing
is irrelevant to the case at hand as this case involves a trial
de novo before the district court, not an administrative hearing.
Finally, the case of One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United
States, 409 U.S. 232, 236 (1971), cited by DABC, also fails to
sufficiently challenge the District Court's conclusion that the
requisite burden of proof in the trial de novo is beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Court's conclusion.

Emerald Stones actually supports the District
The proceeding at issue in Emerald Stones

involved "a separate adjudication brought under the civil
provisions of the forfeiture laws."

The requisite burden of

proof under such civil forfeiture laws was "preponderance of the
evidence."

The proceeding at issue in the case at hand involves

"an adjudication brought under criminal statutes of the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act of Title 32A."

Under Emerald Stones, the

proper and requisite burden of proof under such criminal statutes
is "beyond a reasonable doubt."

am-jenks.brf
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II.

THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE DISTRICT
COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT POP JENKS WAS NOT GUILTY OF THE
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

The DABC failed to brief the issue regarding the District
Court's finding that the DABC did not establish "beyond a
reasonable doubt" that Pop Jenks was guilty of the criminal
offenses charged.5

This failure is probably due to the logical

and practical conclusion that there is no evidence to support the
contrary/ and that the District Court's conclusion of fact will
be given great deference by the reviewing court.

The issue of

the burden of proof is dispositive in this case, and if it is
determined by this Court that the proper burden of proof at the
trial de novo is "beyond a reasonable doubt," there is sufficient
evidence in the record to support the District Court's conclusion
that this burden was not met.
CONCLUSION
Pop Jenks was charged by the DABC with violating the
criminal statutes set forth at Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-12-201 and
32A-5-107.

Pop Jenks was found guilty of violating such statutes

and had its liquor license revoked based upon such determination
pursuant to informal adjudicative proceedings.
5

At a trial de

The issue is raised in its Docketing Statement, however, as issue No. 2 at p. 4.

6

Even the administrative official noted in his Order that "the method of guest sponsorship
described . . . is not illegal, it does present some practical problems for both licensees and investigating
agencies." UABC Commission Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law dated April 14, 1992 at p. 3.
am-jenks.brf
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novo, the District Court dismissed the Complaint against Pop
Jenks finding that there was insufficient evidence to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that Pop Jenks violated such criminal
statutes.
The District Court could very well have found sufficient
evidence that Pop Jenks violated the criminal statutes.

Under

power vested in the District Court, Pop Jenks could have been
found guilty of a class A or B misdemeanor and sentenced up to
one (1) year in jail, fined up to $2,500.00 and/or had its
license suspended.

On this basis, the District Court correctly

determined that the required burden of proof at the trial de novo
in this case was "beyond a reasonable doubt."

The District Court

further correctly determined that the evidence before the Court
did not sufficiently establish Pop Jenks' was guilty of the
alleged violations beyond a reasonable doubt.
Pop Jenks respectfully requests this Court to affirm the
District Court's ruling dismissing the DABC's Complaint against
Pop Jenks for alleged criminal violations of the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act and expunging Pop Jenks' record of any
evidence regarding the same.
DATED this

/($

day of August, 1994.

ALLAN Tl. METOS
Attorney for Appellee Pop ^Tenks
am-jenks.brf
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this

day of August, 1994,

two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE was mailed first-class, postage pre-paid to the
following:

JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General
JAMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
4120 State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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EXHIBIT "A"

32A-5-106

ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES

(d) no member of the club or any of its officers
directors or trustees is under 21 years of age
and
(e) one of the purposes for which the corpora
tion has been organized is for obtaining a license
from the commission for the storage, sale, ser
vice, or consumption of liquor
(3) The Division of Corporations and Commercial
Code shall issue a corporate charter to a private club
nonprofit corporation or association organized under
this chapter only upon receipt of an endorsed affida
vit from the department stating that a true and com
plete copy of the articles of incorporation have been
delivered to the department and that the articles
meet the requirements of the department as established by this chapter and the rules of the commis
sion
(4) Any persons knowingly incorporating under
this chapter with the object of pecuniary profit, and
all persons having possession of any charter issued
under this section, but revoked by the Division of
Corporations and Commercial Code, who refuse upon
demand to deliver the charter so revoked, are guilty
of a class B misdemeanor
1991
32A-5-106. Bond.
(1) Each private club liquor licensee shall post a
cash or corporate surety bond in the penal sum of
$10,000 payable to the department, which the licensee has procured and must maintain for so long as
the licensee continues to operate as a private club
liquor licensee
(2) The bond shall be in a form approved by the
attorney general, conditioned upon the licensee's
faithful compliance with this title and the rules of the
commission
(3) If the $10,000 corporate surety bond is canceled
due to the licensee's negligence, a $300 reinstatement
fee may be assessed No part of any cash or corporate
bond so posted may be withdrawn during the period
the license is in effect, or while revocation proceedings are pending against the licensee A bond filed by
a licensee may be forfeited if the license is finally
revoked
1990
32A-5-107. Operational restrictions.
Each corporation or association granted a private
club liquor license and its employees, officers, managing agent, and members shall abide by the following
conditions and requirements Failure to comply may
result in a suspension or revocation of the license or
other disciplinary action taken against individual
employees or management personnel
(1) Each private club shall hold regular meetings as required by its articles or bylaws and conduct its business through regularly elected officers Within ten days following the election of
any officer, the department shall be notified in
writing of the officer's name, address, and office
to which the officer has been elected, and the
term of that office
(2) Each private club may admit members
only on written application signed by the applicant, following investigation and approval of the
governing body Admissions shall be recorded in
the official minutes of a regular meeting of the
governing body and the application, whether ap
proved or disapproved, shall be filed as a part of
the official records of the licensee An applicant
may not be accorded the privileges of a member
until a quorum of the governing body has formally voted upon and approved the applicant as

258

a member An applicant may not be admitted
membership until seven days after the appli
tion is submitted
(3) Each private club shall maintain a
current
and complete membership record showing tK
date of application of each proposed member th
member's address, the date of admission follow
ing application and the date initiation fees arvi
dues were assessed and paid The record shall
also show the serial number of the membershi
card issued to each member A current record
shall also be kept indicating when members wer*
dropped or resigned
(4) Each private club shall establish m the
club bylaws initial fees and monthly dues, as established by commission rules, which are col.
lected from all members
/> A5) Each private club may allow guests or visi(xxors to use the premises only when previously
authorized by a member A member is responsible for all services extended to guests and visitors If the guest or visitor is a member of the
same fraternal organization as the private club
liquor licensee, no previous authorization is required
(6) Each private club shall limit the issuance
of visitor cards for a period not to exceed two
weeks and assess and collect a fee from each visitor of not less than $5 for each two-week period
the visitor card is issued One dollar of every visitor card fee shall be remitted quarterly to the
department for the administration of this title A
current record of the issuance of each card shall
be maintained and shall contain the name of the
member sponsoring the visitor
.• XI) A private club may not sell alcoholic bever/•ages to any person other than a member, guest,
or visitor who holds a valid visitor card issued
under Subsection (6)
(8) A person who is under 21 years of age may
not be a member, officer, director, or trustee of a
private club
(9) An employee of a club, while on duty, may
not consume an alcoholic beverage, be under the
influence of alcoholic beverages, sponsor a person
for visitor privileges, or act as a host for a guest
(10) A visitor to a club may not host more than
five guests at one time
(11) Each private club shall maintain an expense ledger or record showing in detail all expenditures separated by payments for malt or
brewed beverages, liquor, food, detailed payroll,
entertainment, rent, utilities, supplies, and all
other expenditures This record shall be kept in a
form approved by the department and balanced
each month Each expenditure shall be supported
by delivery tickets, invoices, receipted bills, canceled checks, petty cash vouchers, or other sus^
taming data or memoranda All invoices and receipted bills for the current calendar or fiscal
year documenting purchases made by officers of
the club for the benefit of the club shall also he
maintained
(12) Each private club shall maintain a bank
account that shows all income and expenditures
as a control on the income and disbursements
records This account shall be balanced each
month under the direction of the treasurer or
other officer of the licensee
(13) Each private club shall maintain a
minute book that is posted currently by the secretarv This record shall contain the minutes oi

on notice that the beverage is an alcoholic beverage. The beverage shall bear the label "alcoholicbeverage" or a manufacturer's label which in
common usage apprises the general public that
the beverage contains alcohol.
(2) Failure to comply with the provisions of Subsection (1) may result in suspension or revocation of the
beer wholesaling license or other disciplinary action
taken against individual employees or management
persoinnel of the licensee.
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PART 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS

32A-12-101. Utah Criminal Code applicable.
Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4, Title 76, the Utah Criminal
Code, relating to principles of construction, jurisdiction, venue, limitations of actions, multiple prosecutions, double jeopardy, burdens of proof, definitions,
principles of criminal responsibility, punishments,
and inchoate offenses apply to any criminal offense
defined in this title, except as otherwise provided.
1990

32A-12-102. Special burdens of proof — Infere n c e s and presumptions.
(1) In any prosecution of an offense defined in this
title or in any proceeding brought to enforce this title:
(a) it is not necessary that the state or commission establish the precise description or quantity
of the alcoholic beverages or products or the precise consideration, if any, given or received for
the alcoholic beverages or products;
(b) there is an inference, absent proof to the
contrary, that the alcoholic beverage or product
in question is intoxicating if the witness describes it as intoxicating or by a name t h a t is
commonly applied to an intoxicating alcoholic
beverage or product;
(c) if it is alleged that an association or corporation has violated this title, the fact of the incorporation of the association or corporation is presumed absent proof to the contrary;
(d) a certificate or report signed or purporting
to be signed by any state chemist, assistant state

32A-12-103
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chemist, or state crime laboratory chemist, as to
the analysis or ingredients of any alcoholic beverage or product is prima facie evidence of the
facts stated in that certificate or report and of the
authority of the person giving or making the report, and is admissible in evidence without any
proof of appointment or signature absent proof to
the contrary;
(e) a copy of entries made in the records of the
United States internal revenue collector, certified by the collector or a qualified notary public,
showing the payment of the United States internal revenue special tax for the manufacture or
sale of alcoholic beverages or products is prima
facie evidence of the manufacture or sale by the
party named in the entry within the period set
forth in the. record.
(2) (a) In proving the unlawful sale, disposal, gift,
or purchase, gratuitous or otherwise, or consumption of alcoholic beverages or products, it is
not necessary that the state or commission establish that any money or other consideration actually passed or that an alcoholic beverage or product was actually consumed if the court or trier of
fact is satisfied that a transaction in the nature
of a sale, disposal, gift, or purchase actually occurred or that any consumption of alcoholic beverages or products was about to occur.
(b) Proof of consumption or intended consumption of an alcoholic beverage or product on premises on which consumption is prohibited, by some
person not authorized to consume alcoholic beverages or products on those premises, is evidence
that an alcoholic beverage or product was sold or
given to or purchased by the person consuming,
about to consume, or carrying away the alcoholic
beverage or product as against the occupant of
the premises.
1990
32A-12-103. Criminal responsibility for conduct
of another.
In addition to Title 76, Chapter 2, Part 2 of the
Utah Criminal Code relating to criminal responsibility for the conduct of another, the following principles
apply to violations of this title:
(1) If a violation of this title is committed by
any person in the employ of the occupant of any
premises in which the offense is committed, or by
any person who is required by the occupant to be
or remain in or upon the premises, or to act in
any way for the occupant, the occupant is prima
facie considered a party to the offense committed,
and is liable as a principal offender, notwithstanding the fact that the offense was committed
by a person who is not proved to have committed
it under or by the direction of the occupant. Nothing in this section relieves the person actually
committing the offense from liability.
(2) If a violation of this title is committed by a
corporation or association, the officer or agent of
the corporation or association in charge of the
premises in which the offense is committed is
prima facie considered a party to the offense committed, and is personally liable to the penalties
prescribed for the offense as a principal offender.
Nothing in this section relieves the corporation
or association or the person who actually committed the offense from liability.
1990
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B misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided in this title.
1990
32A-12-105. A d d i t i o n a l c r i m i n a l p e n a l t i e s .
In addition to the penalties provided in Title 76, the
Utah Criminal Code, Chapter 3:
(1) Upon any defendant's conviction of any offense defined in this title, the court may also order the defendant to make restitution or pay
costs in accordance with Title 77, the Utah Code
of Criminal Procedure, Chapter 32a.
(2) Upon a corporation's or association's conviction of any offense defined in this title, and a
failure of the corporation or association to pay a
fine imposed upon it, the corporate powers,
rights, and privileges of the corporation or association, if it is a domestic corporation or association, may be suspended or revoked, and if a foreign corporation, it forfeits its right to do intrastate business in this state. The department shall
transmit the name of each corporation or association to the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, which shall immediately record the action in a manner that makes the information
available to the public. The suspension, revocation, or forfeiture is effective from the time the
record is made, and the certificate of the Division
of Corporations and Commercial Code is prima
facie evidence of the suspension, revocation, or
forfeiture. Nothing contained in this section may
be construed as affecting, limiting, or restricting
any proceedings that otherwise may be taken for
the imposition of any other punishment or the
modes of enforcement or recovery of fines or penalties.
(3) Upon the conviction of any business entity
required to have a business license to operate its
business activities, or upon the conviction of any
of its agents, employees, or officers of any offense
defined in this title, with the knowledge, consent,
or acquiescence of the business entity, the department shall forward a copy of the judgment of
conviction to the appropriate governmental entity responsible for issuing and revoking the
business licenses. That governmental entity may
institute appropriate proceedings to revoke the
business' license, and upon revocation, a license
may not be granted to the business entity for at
least one year from the date of revocation. Upon
the conviction for a second or other offense, a
license may not be granted for at least two years
from the date of revocation.
(4) Upon conviction of any physician, pharmacist, druggist, dentist, or veterinarian of any offense defined in this title, the department shall
forward a certified copy of the judgment of conviction to the Department of Commerce. That department may institute appropriate proceedings
to revoke the defendant's license, and upon revocation, a license may not be granted to the defendant by the department for at least one year from
the date of revocation. Upon the defendant's conviction for a second or other offense, a license
may not be granted for at least two years from
the date of revocation.
1990
PART 2
SALE, PURCHASE, POSSESSION, AND
CONSUMPTION

32A-12-104. Violation of title a misdemeanor. <• 32A-12-201. Unlawful sale or supply.
Any person who violates this title or the commis(1) It is unlawful for any person, licensee, permitsion rules adopted under this title is guilty of a class \ t e e , or their officers, managers, employees, or agents
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to keep for sale, or to directly or indirectly or upon
any pretense or device, sell, offer to sell, or otherwise
furnish or supply to another, any alcoholic beverage
0 r product, except as provided by this title or the
rules of the commission adopted under this title.
(2) Except as otherwise provided, a manufacturer,
sU pplier, or importer of liquor, wine, and heavy beer
products, and their employees, agents, and representatives may not sell, offer to sell, solicit or canvass for
orders, or otherwise furnish or supply these products
to another within this state other than the department and military installations.
1993
32A-12-202. Unauthorized sale o r s u p p l y .
A person authorized by this title to sell any alcoholic beverage or product, and an officer, manager,
employee, or agent of t h a t person may not sell, offer
to sell, or otherwise furnish or supply, any alcoholic
beverage or product in any place, or at any day or
time other than as authorized by this title or the
rules of the commission.
1990
32A-12-203. Unlawful sale or supply to minors.
(1) A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise
furnish or supply any alcoholic beverage or product to
any person under the age of 21 years.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (1),
a person who knowingly sells, offers to sell, or otherwise furnishes or supplies any alcoholic beverage or
product to any person under the age of 21 years is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) This section does not apply to the furnishing or
supplying of an alcoholic beverage or product to a
minor for medicinal purposes by the parent or guardian of the minor or by the minor's physician or dentist, in accordance with this title.
1991
32A-12-204, Unlawful sale or supply to intoxicated persons.
A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise
furnish or supply any alcoholic beverage or product to
any person who is apparently under the influence of
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs
or to a person whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew or should have known from the
circumstances was under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs.
1990
32A-12-205. Unlawful sale or supply to interdicted p e r s o n s .
( D A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise
furnish or supply any alcoholic beverage or product to
any known interdicted person.
(2) This section does not apply to the furnishing or
supplying of an alcoholic beverage or product to an
interdicted person upon the prescription of a physician, or administered by a physician, dentist, or hospital under this title.
1990
32A-12-206. Unlawful sale or supply of beer.
(1) A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise
furnish or supply beer to the general public in conJoiners larger than two liters. This does not preclude
licensed beer wholesalers from selling, offering to
***}* or otherwise furnishing or supplying beer in containers larger t h a n two liters to beer retailers authori2e
" by this title to dispense beer on draft for consumption on the beer retailer's licensed premises.
v*) A person may not purchase or possess beer in
containers larger t h a n two liters unless the person is
*beer retailer authorized by this title to dispense
? e e r on draft for consumption on the beer retailer's
wcensed premises.
1991

32A-12-212

32A-12-207. Unlawful sale o r s u p p l y d u r i n g
emergency.
( D A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise
furnish or supply any alcoholic product in an area
during a period of emergency proclaimed by the governor to exist in the area.
(2) This section does not apply if, in the judgment
of the governor, the emergency does not require suspension of sale or supply of alcoholic beverages, and
the emergency proclamation so provides.
1990
32A-12-208. Unlawful p u r c h a s e o r a c c e p t a n c e .
It is unlawful for any person, or the person's officer,
manager, employee, or agent, directly or indirectly or
upon any pretense or device, to purchase, take, or
accept any alcoholic beverage or product from any
other person, except as provided by this title or the
rules of the commission adopted under this title. 1990
32A-12-209. Unlawful p u r c h a s e , p o s s e s s i o n , o r
c o n s u m p t i o n by m i n o r s .
(1) It is unlawful for any person under the age of
21 years to purchase, possess, or consume any alcoholic beverage or product, unless specifically authorized by this title.
(2) It is unlawful for any person under the age of
21 years to misrepresent his age, or for any other
person to misrepresent the age of a minor, for the
purpose of purchasing or otherwise obtaining an alcoholic beverage or product for a minor.
(3) It is unlawful for any person under the age of
21 years to possess or consume any alcoholic beverage
while riding in a limousine or chartered bus.
1992
32A-12-210. Unlawful p u r c h a s e by i n t o x i c a t e d
persons.
A person may not purchase any alcoholic beverage
or product when he is under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages, products, or drugs.
1990
32A-12-211. Unlawful purchase b y interdicted
persons.
A person may not purchase or possess any alcoholic
beverage or product if he is an interdicted person,
except as prescribed or administered by a physician,
dentist, or hospital under this title.
1990
32A-12-212. Unlawful p o s s e s s i o n — E x c e p t i o n s .
(1) A person may not have or possess within this
state any liquor unless authorized by this title or the
rules of the commission, except that:
(a) a person who clears United States Customs
when entering this country may have or possess
for personal consumption and not for sale or resale, a maximum of one liter of liquor purchased
from without the United States; or
(b) a person who moves his residence to this
state from outside of this state may have or possess for personal consumption and not for sale or
resale, any liquor previously purchased outside
the state and brought into this state during the
move, if:
(i) the person first obtains department approval prior to moving the liquor into the
state;
(ii) the department affixes the official
state label to the liquor; and
(iii) the person pays the department a reasonable administrative handling fee as determined by the commission.
(2) Approval under Subsection (l)(b) may be obtained by persons who are either transferring their
permanent residences to this state or who maintain
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(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer
and to each party.
(')) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the ret r or review, or within the time period provided
? a^ncy rule, whichever is longer, any party may
r\p a response with the person designated by statute
rule to receive the response. One copy of the reoonse shall be sent by mail to each of the parties and
to the presiding officer.
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review
r>f an order by the agency or a superior agency, the
airency or superior agency shall review the order
vithin a reasonable time or within the time required
3y statute or the agency's rules.
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior
jgency may by order or rule permit the parties to file
griefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument.
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to
ill parties.
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of
any response, other filings, or oral argument, or
within the time required by statute or applicable
rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a
written order on review.
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the
agency head or by a person designated by the
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to
each party
(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed:
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues
reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the
issues reviewed;
tv) the reasons for the disposition;
(vh whether the decision of the presiding
officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed,
or modified, and whether all or any portion
of the adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded;
Cvii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or judicial review available to aggrieved parties; and
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review.
i9S8
63-46b-13. A g e n c y review — Reconsideration.
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order
is issued for which review by the agency or by a
superior agency under Section 63-46b 12 is unavailable, and if the order would otherwise con
stitute final agency action, any party may file a
written request for reconsideration with the
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which
relief is requested.
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the
filing of the request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order.
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed
with the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to
each party by the person making the request.
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for
that purpose, shall issue a written order granting
the request or denying the request.
(b) If the agency head or the person designated
for that purpose does not issue an order within 20
days after the filing of the request, the request
for reconsideration shall be considered to be denied.
1988

63-46b-15

63-46b-14.

J u d i c i a l review — E x h a u s t i o n of administrative r e m e d i e s .
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of
final agency action, except in actions where judicial
review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or
all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate, or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in
irreparable harm disproportionate to the
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3.i (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after
the date that the order constituting the final
agency action is issued or is considered to have
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b).
(b> The petition shall name the agency and all
other appropriate parties as respondents and
shall meet the form requirements specified in
this chapter.
I98fl
63-46b-15.

J u d i c i a l review — Informal adjudicative p r o c e e d i n g s .
< U (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to
review by trial de novo all final agency actions
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, except that the juvenile court shall have
jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating
to removal or placement decisions regarding children in state custody.
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be as provided in the
statute governing the agency or, in the absence
of such a venue provision, in the county where
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal
place of business.
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and shall include:
(i) the name and mailing address of the
party seeking judicial review;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the
respondent agency;
(iii) the title and date of the final agency
action to be reviewed, together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of
the agency action;
(iv) identification of the persons who were
parties in the informal adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action;
(v) a copy of the written agency order from
the informal proceeding;
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain
judicial review;
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the
type and extent of relief requested;
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the
petitioner is entitled to relief.

63-46b-16
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(bj All additional pleadings and proceedings in
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure
(3) (a) The district court, without a jurv, shall de
termine all questions of fact and lav. and any
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial proceedings under this section
1990
63-46b-16.

Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica
tive proceedings
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record,
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre
paring transcripts and copies for the record
(I) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record, or
(II) according to any other provision of
law
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied,
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute,
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution,
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law,
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed
to follow prescribed procedure,
(0 the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification,
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi
nation of fact, made or implied by the agenc>,
t h a t is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court,
(h) the agency action is
(I) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute,
(II) contrary to a rule of the agency,
(III) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency, or
(IV) otherwise arbitrary or capricious 1988
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63-46b-17 J u d i c i a l r e v i e w — T y p e of rebef
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjud*
tive proceedings by the district court or the
view of formal adjudicative proceedings by an
pellate court, the court may award damages
compensation only to the extent expressly auth
nzed by statute
(b) In granting relief, the court may
(I) order agency action required by l a w
(II) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law,
(III) set aside or modify agency action
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of
agency action, or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for
further proceedings
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court
if authorized by statute
1987
63-46b-18.

Judicial review — S t a y and other
temporary remedies pending final disposition.
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the
agency may grant a stay of its order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review,
according to the agency's rules
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested by a party, the agency's
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary
remedy was not granted
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it
finds that
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying the stay, or
(b) (1) the party seeking judicial review is
likely to prevail on the merits when the
court finally disposes of the matter,
(II) the party seeking judicial review will
suffer irreparable injury without immediate
relief,
(III) granting relief to the party seeking
review will not substantially harm other
parties to the proceedings, and
(iv) the t h r e a t to the public health, safety,
or welfare relied upon by the agency is not
sufficiently serious to justify the agency's action under the circumstances
1987
63-46b 19. Civil enforcement.
11) la) In addition to other remedies provided by
law, an agency may seek enforcement of an order
by seeking civil enforcement in the district
courts
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an
agency's order must name, as defendants, each
alleged violator against whom the agency seeks
to obtain civil enforcement
(c) Venue for an action seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order shall be determined by
the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(d) The action may request, and the court may
grant, any of the following
(1) declaratory relief,
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